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The UK Health and Safety Executive in collaboration with the Pipeline and Hazardous Materials 
Safety Administration (US Department of Transport) have carried out a detailed review of very 
large vapor cloud explosions (VCEs) associated with pipeline failures and losses of containment 
at refineries as well as LPG, LNG and gasoline storage sites. In the first instance this work is 
intended to inform assessment of the potential for escalation at LNG sites, in the case of an 
explosion following a significant leak of refrigerant gases (e.g. propane and iso-butane), but the 
findings are relevant to a wide range of petrochemical sites.  
The review has focussed on two areas: 
1. The relationship between weather conditions, source term and development of the 
flammable cloud.  
Surprisingly, we have found that a majority of very large vapor cloud incidents occurred in nil or 
very low wind conditions. Rather than being catastrophic failures of large pipes or vessels, many 
of the most serious vapor cloud incidents were relatively small but sustained leaks, where vapor 
accumulated near the source and built up a substantial cloud over tens of minutes. In very low 
wind conditions, the clouds spread through the action of gravity with very low rates of entrainment; 
the flammable zone reached more than 500m from the source in several cases. The incident record 
suggests that small leaks in very low winds may be a more likely cause of major incidents than 
those catastrophic failures that produce a significant vapor cloud in any weather conditions.  
2. Consequences of explosion in clouds with higher reactivity than methane 
Examination of primary data from a number of LPG and gasoline incident investigations showed 
that in many cases severe overpressure effects extended to a high proportion of the cloud and the 
damage was not confined to areas where there was congested pipework or vegetation. In fact, we 
have not identified any reports of very large premixed clouds of gasoline vapor (with radius in 
excess of 200 m) which have burned slowly as flash fires. Notwithstanding the lack of pressure 
effects, such flash fires could cause deaths or injuries and would certainly have left a huge burned 
area. It seems likely that such occurrences would be reported in many parts of the world. The lack 
of such reports suggests that if a very large gasoline cloud develops in a normal industrial context, 
the probability of a severe explosion is high. The situation for LPG is less clear cut: a significant 
proportion of large clouds caused by pipeline failures have burned as flash fires. The majority of 
these flash fires occurred in zero wind conditions and were probably very fuel rich. 
The paper reviews the damage caused by test detonations on a range of common objects including 
overpressure-sensitive objects like drums and boxes and drag-sensitive columnar objects like 
scaffold poles and fence posts. The latter types of object exhibit a very characteristic distribution 
of plastic strain along the column length, resulting in continuous curvature rather than strain 
concentrated in plastic hinges. 
Previously unpublished data from the Flixborough explosion are presented. The vapor cloud 
(extending up to 180 m from the plant) included many continuously curved poles and posts that 
matched the detonation test results. There is strong evidence that a large part of the cloud in this 
incident detonated. 
The paper also presents data from the VCE at San Juan, Puerto Rico (2009). High quality 
photographic records and CCTV images allow the progress of this VCE to be reconstructed. The 
location in which transition to a severe explosion occurred is of particular interest in guiding risk 
assessment at other sites. The site of the San Juan explosion was also rich in lightweight columnar 
objects but no examples of continuous curvature were recorded. Other large VCEs at Buncefield 
(2005) and Jaipur (2009) showed similar characteristics on the basis of this evidence. It seems 
unlikely that these incidents were detonations. Video records of the speed of flame spread at San 
Juan support this conclusion. 
The regular occurrence of severe explosions extending to the whole cloud has been recognised in 
the years since Buncefield. There has been a general presumption that this means that all such 
incidents were detonations, since this is the only mechanism for sustaining explosions in fairly 
open areas that has been demonstrated experimentally. There is now very strong evidence that 
there must be at least one other mechanism by which severe explosions in very large clouds can 
progress in open areas. The gap in scale between experiments and real clouds is very large; there 
was always a chance that important large-scale phenomena might have been missed. The paper 
examines one potential explanation for the observed behaviour that involves thermal radiation 
warming pre-mixed gas clouds ahead of the advancing flame front during a VCE. The analysis 
suggests that radiation effects may be the key to understanding the explosion mechanism in many 
incidents. 
The paper concludes with a discussion of how the new data on vapor cloud explosions that has 




A total of 24 incidents were selected for review on the basis of the size of the area affected by the 
explosion, the scale of losses and the completeness of information available about the 
circumstances of the incident. The review collected data in the following areas: 
 
1. Substances (gasoline, LPG, hydrocarbons used as refrigerants); 
2. Source term (e.g. tank overfill, sprays, seal failure, hole size and release pressure); 
3. Release size (duration of release, inventory); 
4. Weather conditions (wind speed, stability); 
5. Near field dispersion – especially the formation of a low entrainment, gravity-driven flow; 
6. Cloud development (footprint, depth and influence of topography and surface roughness); 
7. Explosion severity (flame speed and overpressure, distance of flame travel); 
8. Blast damage to plant and other structures within and outside the cloud footprint; 
9. Harm to on- and off-site personnel; 
10. Information about the facility: 
a. Location (latitude/longitude), characteristics (ports, urban, rural, industrial, etc.); 
b. Maps of facility showing the property and surrounding area; 
c. Category of facility (possible categories - refineries, petrochemical, gas processing, 
terminals and distribution and upstream), description of facility; 
d. Number of similar facilities in the world; 
11. Information about the incident and the engineering practices at the site: 
a. Description and cause of the release (e.g. operator error, equipment malfunction, 
material failure, construction or design error, weld failure) 
b. Mitigation measures in place and their effectiveness 
An additional objective of the review was, where possible, to make publically available more 
detailed primary records of what happened in the incidents. These records include photographs of 
the aftermath and any video records of cloud accumulation and explosion. Four electronic 
multimedia packages have been prepared to allow wider access to primary data from the incidents 
at Buncefield (Buncefield Major Incident Investigation Board, 2007), Jaipur (MoPNG Committee, 
2010), Flixborough (Flixborough Court of Enquiry, 1975) and San Juan (CSB 2015). The authors 
are indebted to the Chemical Safety Board (CSB) for making available a large amount of data from 
their investigation at San Juan. 
 
Findings on vapor cloud formation 
The incidents reviewed are listed in Table 1; this table also includes information about the rate at 
which hydrocarbon vapors were added to the cloud and the time between the start of the release 
and ignition. The data in Table 1 have been classified according to the wind conditions at the time 
of the release. This wind data comes from meteorological records and analysis of the cloud shape. 
For example, cases where the cloud spread in all direction around the source to a roughly equal 




Table 1: Summary of vapor transport conditions in the incidents reviewed 
(mass release rates/durations included for non-pipeline failures – where known) 





to igniton (s)  
Brenham, TX  1992 LPG Storage 100 3600 
Newark, NJ  1983 Gasoline storage 35 >900 
Big Spring,  TX  2008 Refinery not known 500 
San Juan, Puerto Rico 2009 Gasoline storage 50 1560 
Skikda, Algeria 2004 LNG facility ~10 <300s 
Buncefield, UK    2005 Gasoline storage 19 1380 
Amuay, Venezuela 2012 Refinery LPG storage 67 4080 
Jaipur, India 2009 Gasoline storage 34 4500 
Austin , TX  1973 LPG pipeline   
North Blenheim, NY 1990 LPG pipeline   
Donnellson, IA 1978 LPG pipeline   
Ruff Creek, PA 1977 LPG pipeline   
Incidents that probably occurred in nil/low-wind conditions 
Port Hudson, MO 1970 LPG pipeline   
St Herblain, France 1991 Gasoline storage not known 1200 
Geismer, LA 2013 Petrochemicals not known  
Naples, Italy 1995 Gasoline storage 20 5400 
La Mede, France 1992 Refinery 25 600 
Incidents that occurred in light or moderate winds 
Baton Rouge, LA 1989 Refinery 681 150 
Norco, LA 1988 Refinery 257 30 
Pasadena, CA 1989 HDPE 643 60 
Flixborough, UK 1974 Petrochemicals 670 45 
Devers, TX 1975 LPG Pipeline   
Lively, TX 1996 LPG Pipeline   
Ufa, USSR 1989 LPG Pipeline   
 
It is notable that the incidents studied fell into two distinct groups: 
1. Large releases (>250 kg/s) in light or moderate winds. These catastrophic releases were 
ignited rapidly as vapor was convected downstream – typically within 100s. 
 
2. Smaller releases (<100 kg/s) in very low or nil wind conditions. These smaller releases 
accumulated over longer periods – typically several hundred or thousands of seconds. 




Figure 1: CCTV image of the vapor cloud at Buncefield - well away for the source. The flat 
upper surface indicates a laminarised flow. 
The large proportion of incidents (71%) that corresponded to relatively small leak rates and 
accumulation of vapor in very low winds was initially surprising. In fact, these results suggest 
that incident scenarios involving dispersion in nil or very low speed wind conditions may 
dominate the total explosion risk at many sites. 
This finding has been investigated further by modelling the dispersion of a flashing release of 49 
tonnes of liquid propane from a 30,000 gall tank (80% fill) through a 2” hole (32 kg/s). The tank 
emptied in 1526 seconds. The area covered by the flammable cloud in D2 conditions - which 
corresponds to a 2 m/s wind speed and stability class D (Pasquill, 1961) - was studied with 
PHAST (DNV, 2013).  If the jet was directed or deflected upwards the size of the flammable 
cloud was zero or very small (<< 1 acre). The worst case of a jet aligned with the wind (which is 
rather unlikely) gave an area within the LFL contour of ~ 2 acres. Note: 1 acre = 4,047 m² = 0.4047 
hectares = 0.004047 km²) 
 
On the other hand, analysis of the size of the cloud in very low wind conditions by the method 
described in FABIG Technical Note 12 (Atkinson and Pursell, 2013) gave a maximum 
flammable cloud size of approximately 150 acres.  
In practice, many of the vapor clouds studied in the review covered areas of order 100 acres 
before ignition and we conclude that the density of ignition sources in these cases was of order 
0.01 per acre. It follows that even in the worst case, the ignition probability for the 2” propane 
release in F2 conditions is 2% or less; whereas the ignition probability if the cloud is allowed to 
accumulate in still conditions may be close to 100%.  
This illustrates why nil or very low speed conditions appear to dominate the records of major 
incidents: these weather conditions are somewhat rarer than light winds but they are associated 
with very large clouds and the risk of ignition is very much higher. Also very low wind 
conditions allow the development of a cloud that has the potential to cause a major accident for 
relatively low rates of vapor release. Such losses of containment are much more likely than large 
release rates (at least for non-pipeline incidents).  
 
What wind speeds qualify as “nil or very low”? 
Normally nil/low-wind conditions develop in stably stratified atmospheric conditions and are 
easily recognised. The density gradient near the ground is sufficient to suppress turbulent mixing 
in the lowest part of the atmosphere; this occurs when the Richardson number (Ri) is greater than 












    where 
Δρ is the (total) density difference across the stably stratified boundary layer, 
ρ0 is the ambient density,  
h is the depth of the stable layer, 
u is the speed of the overlying airflow,  
g is the gravitational acceleration (assumed to be 10 m/s2). 
Typical values in a stable boundary layer are Δρ / ρ0  = 0.01 and  h  = 30m (100 ft). The condition 
Ri > 0.25 implies u < 3.4 m/s. So, as a rule of thumb, if the overlying wind speed is 3 m/s or less 
the wind at ground level will drop out completely in conditions of rapid ground cooling (e.g. in 
clear conditions when the sun goes down). When the stable gradient decays (normally a little while 
after sun rise) the overlying wind can penetrate to ground level and nil/low-wind conditions cease.  
It is possible for very low wind speeds in stable or neutral conditions to give laminarised vapor 
flows that are dominated by gravitational slumping and which entrain air very slowly. Work by 
Briggs et al (1990) on detrainment of heavy gas from depressions is useful in analysing this 
problem. Briggs showed that detrainment (stripping) of heavy gas from a pool in a depression 
occurs close to the upstream edge of the pool. As the current of air reaches the edge of the pool 
the boundary layer thickness (and hence the Richardson number) is necessarily small and turbulent 
mixing – entrainment of the heavy gas – must occur. As the mixing layer thickens the Richardson 
number increases until at some point it is large enough for further entrainment to be suppressed. 
Normally this thickening occurs fairly close to the upstream edge and there is no entrainment over 
the rest of the pool. 
Briggs found that the rate of (volume) detrainment of the heavy gas per unit width of pool exposed 






V        where 
U is the flow speed over the surface and g' is the reduced density: 
g' = g. Δρ/ρ 
Note this detrainment rate is not a function of the downwind length of the pool of heavy gas – 
because detrainment only occurs close to the upstream edge. 
The flow is illustrated in Figure 2: this shows how gravity driven flow can occur beneath a light 
wind. The rate of entrainment of air into the bulk of the heavy current is very low and the vapor 
cloud can travel many hundreds of metres with only small reductions in concentration. This means 
that if the cloud is in the flammable range when it laminarises close to the source, then it will 
























Figure 2: Detrainment of a heavy gas by a light wind  
Brigg’s detrainment formula can be used to estimate the critical Richardson number at which 
entrainment stops. If it is assumed that the gas volume fraction and velocity vary linearly across 
the mixing layer which is of depth h then integration of the product of volume fraction and flow 
speed across the layer gives the volume flux D of detrained gas (per unit width) as D = Uh/6. 
 
The depth h will stop increasing when           Ri = g'h/U2 = Ricrit 
Substituting for h from the equation above gives    Ricrit = g' 6D / U3 
Comparing with the Brigg’s formula gives   Ricrit = 0.05 x 6 = 0.3 
 
A typical range value for the density difference in a vapor cloud is ∆ρ/ρ =0.05 to 0.1 which leads 
to g' = 0.5 to 1. A typical value for the depth of the whole heavy layer is h = 2 m. The condition 
for laminar (non-entraining) flow in a stratified layer in the top 25% of the gas flow (with 
undiluted heavy gas flow beneath) is h = 0.5m 
Substituting into the formula Ricrit = g'h/U2 = 0.3 gives an upper limit of wind speed of  
 
Stationary heavy gas 
  
Entraining region in 
thickening mixing layer  
 Ri < Ricrit 
Laminar stratified layer 
No further entrainment  
 Ri ~ Ricrit 
Undiluted gas 
 Light wind 
U < 0.9 m/s for g' = 0.5 m/s2   
U < 1.3 m/s for g' = 1 m/s2 
Low wind speeds (< 1.3 m/s) are consequently required to allow gravity driven vapor transport 
with minimal dilution. For wind speeds greater than about 2.5 m/s, the mixing layer will not be 
able to deepen sufficiently to prevent entrainment over the bulk of the pool and the heavy gas will 
rapidly disperse. 
Note these limits on wind speed apply at the top surface of the heavy gas flow – i.e. at a height of 
about 2 m. Wind speed data is normally recorded at a height of 10 m and there can be a significant 
drop in speed closer to the ground, depending on the roughness length. For roughness length 0.1m 
(which is typical of general agricultural land with a few scattered obstacles) the ratio of wind 
speeds at a height of 10 m and 2 m is U(10m)/ U(2m) ~1.5.  
The condition for 75% of the gas cloud to remain undiluted (based on wind speeds measured at 
10m) becomes: 
U (10m) < 0.9 x 1.5 = 1.35 m/s     for g' = 0.5 m/s2   
U (10m) < 1.3 x 1.5 = 1.95 m/s     for g' = 1 m/s2 
The Briggs formula provides a means of estimating the potential maximum size of vapor clouds if 
the loss of containment is not stopped. It is assumed: that the cloud is circular; that near-source 
dilution is to a stoichiometric concentration of 0.076 kg/m3 and that the value of reduced gravity 
is g' = 0.5 m/s2. The cross-wind extent of the vapor cloud may increase until the rate of detrainment 
matches the rate of volume addition by the source. Equilibrium vapor cloud diameters are shown 
below for various hydrocarbon release rates and wind speeds. 
Table 2: Equilibrium cloud diameters (m) at various values of mass release rate and wind 
speed 
    Wind speed (m/s) 
Mass release rate 
(kg/s) 
1 m/s 2 m/s 3 m/s 
10 1316 m 164 m 49 m 
25 3289 m 411 m 122 m 
50 6579 m 822 m 244 m 
 
For the lowest value of wind speed (1 m/s) the maximum potential cloud size is very large and in 
practice the maximum size of an unignited cloud is likely to be limited by the time for isolation 
of the leak or complete loss of inventory. 
The idea of a secondary source or gas blanket covering the leak is a feature of some heavy gas 
dispersion models designed for windy conditions e.g. DEGADIS (Havens and Spicer 1988). The 
gas blanket grows until it is large enough for the rate of detrainment to match the gas input rate. 
Our review of incidents suggests that a high proportion occur in low wind conditions where the 
rate of detrainment is small compared with the feed rate. The gas blanket grows throughout the 
release as only a small proportion of the release gas is actually carried away. The volume of the 
cloud is set by release conditions and entrainment rates prior to laminarisation but the cloud 
shape is a function of topography around the site. Increases in ground elevation of 2-3 m are 
sufficient to stop the progress of the gravity driven flow. On flat sites the cloud is observed to 
spread roughly equally in all directions but, in several of the cases reviewed, vapor flowed along 
valleys and accumulated in hollows. 
 
Forensic analysis of blast damage 
Forensic techniques for the interpretation of blast effects have improved greatly in the last ten 
years, especially for low lying vapor clouds. Pressure-impulse diagrams are now available for 
some standard objects like drums and steel boxes that are sensitive to overpressure (crushing) 
damage (Chen, 2013). It is possible to identify severe explosions (defined here as those generating 
overpressures in excess of 2000 mbar or 29 psi) with confidence by examining such objects. 
Detonation tests have also demonstrated the type of damage to be expected in that type of explosion 
(SCI, 2014). 
In low-lying clouds over relatively flat open areas, the direction of breakage of trees and posts 
gives a useful indication of the direction of explosion propagation (SCI, 2009). This type of 
analysis has been used in some of the cases reviewed to identify the location of the point of 
transition where a flash fire accelerated to become a severe explosion. 
There is also a previously undocumented means of discriminating between different types of 
severe explosion based on examination of slender, columnar objects such as lamp posts, scaffold 
tubes, fence posts etc. In detonation tests and some vapor cloud explosions, these objects display 
a characteristic pattern of distributed plastic deformation which leads to continuous curvature 
along the length rather than concentration of plastic deformation in “hinges”. This behaviour is 
associated with the very high impulsive loads experienced during the normal impingement of a 
detonation. These loads accelerate lightweight spars on a time scale that is short compared with 
the transit of (elastic) flexural waves from points of restraint. Continuously curvature is very easy 
to spot in incident photographs and if it can be established that a spar has not been affected by a 
prolonged fire, then the curvature is a very good indicator that detonation has occurred. Fast 
deflagrations do not produce the highly impulsive forces required. 
 
Review of blast damage in incidents 
In many of the incidents reviewed there was clear forensic evidence that a severe explosion had 
propagated into open uncongested areas (Atkinson, 2015). This was a feature of all of the large 
vapor cloud incidents for which detailed primary evidence was available and is very likely to have 
been the case in all of the incidents. This observation challenges the normal assumptions made in 
blast damage assessment using, for example, the Multi-Energy Method (Van den Berg 1985) in 
which it is normally assumed that high overpressures are only sustained in congested areas. 
In the years since Buncefield it has been recognised that severe explosions frequently extend to 
the whole cloud. There has been a general presumption that this means that all such incidents were 
detonations since this is the only established theory that allows sufficiently rapid burning to be 
sustained in open areas. The results of this review cast doubt on this presumption: there are serious 
discrepancies between the effects of experimental detonation on a variety of objects and what has 
been observed at most severe VCE incidents. For example, as noted above, normal impact by an 
experimental detonation can leave slender column-like objects with continuous curvature and this 
has also been observed in a wide range of objects at Flixborough. However no objects with this 
type of deformation have been observed at the sites that have previously been presumed to have 
been detonations: Buncefield, Jaipur, Amuay and San Juan (Figure 3). Similar discrepancies have 
been noted for all of the other types of damage e.g. the deformation of drums, boxes and vehicles: 
the impact of a detonation is associated with very high impulsive forces on the upstream face and 
corresponding asymmetric deformation (Figure 4).  This type of damage was not observed in the 
fast deflagration incidents at Buncefield, Jaipur, Amuay and San Juan. 
It is consequently appropriate to critically examine the assumption that has underpinned VCE 
assessment for the last 30 years namely that (unless Deflagration – Detonation Transition , DDT 
occurs) high overpressures are confined to congested areas. The incident data suggest that severe 
explosions can progress by a different mechanism: one that has not yet been observed in 
experimental tests on congestion arrays in gas tents. There is a large gap between the scale of 
clouds in real incidents and available test data and it was always possible that very-large scale 
phenomena might have been missed. 
The data suggest that this new type of explosion is episodic in nature (Atkinson, 2011a, 2011b, 
2015). Rapid phases of burning are punctuated by pauses. The overall rate of progress of the 
flame is sub-sonic. This effect is shown directly in CCTV footage of the explosion at San Juan. 
It is suggested below that, at very large scale, radiation may play a key role in driving 
explosions. Pressure waves from a severe, localised explosion may disturb particles on the 
ground and other surfaces. Thermal radiation impacting on such re-suspended particles would 
lead to pre-warming of the surrounding gas and the development of an area ahead of the flame 
where the gas is warmer and consequently more reactive. At some point this warmed gas could 
react violently, producing a localised explosion capable of re-elevating more particles and 








                   
Figure 3: Damage to slender columnar objects: lamp posts, fence posts, scaffold poles etc. 
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Figure 4 : Damage to near full drums: 
a. Incident  (Jaipur) – symmetrical deformation 
b. Pressure test (2 bar) – symmetrical deformation 
c. Detonation test (arrow indicates deformation on the side impacted by detonation) 
 
Evidence from the review on transition to a severe explosion 
The transition to a severe (but not detonative) explosion regime seems to involve some degree of 
congestion or confinement. Based on the incidents studied, the following may act as triggers: 
confined explosions in buildings (e.g. pump houses), dense vegetation, pipe racks and other 
moderately congested plant. Figure 5 shows the area in which the transition to a severe explosion 
was observed to occur in the San Juan incident. The extent and density of congestion required is 
substantially less than that required for DDT.  
 
 
Figure 5: Area in which the San Juan explosion made a transition from flash fire to fast 
deflagration. After transition the flame progressed in an unsteady (episodic) manner at a sub-sonic 
average speed. 
 
The review did not find any reports of very large premixed gasoline clouds (R>200 m) which 
burned slowly as flash fires. Notwithstanding the lack of pressure effects, such flash fires could 
cause deaths or injuries and would certainly leave a huge burned area. It seems likely that a high 
proportion of such occurrences would be reported. As discussed below, several LPG flash fires 
have been reported. The lack of such reports for gasoline clouds suggests that if a very large cloud 
develops in the context of a fuel depot, the probability of a severe explosion is high. 
Our observations of the circumstances under which transition has occurred in the past provide an 
explanation for this: the density of pipework and other plant and the type of buildings that have 
provided triggers for transition are typical of fuel storage sites and could be expected in almost all 
sites. Again the conclusion is that if a very large cloud develops on a normal site it is appropriate 
to assume that the risk of transition to a severe (non-detonative) explosion is high (close to unity). 




but currently we lack the fundamental understanding required to specify the levels of congestion 
and confinement that are acceptable.  
The evidence at Flixborough strongly suggests that, in this case, deflagration to detonation 
transition (DDT) occurred in highly confined and congested areas, and that the resulting detonation 
propagated widely through the extensive cloud around the plant, causing massive damage. 
Avoiding the potential for DDT by appropriate plant layout remains a priority. In addition 
particular consideration should be given to the location and design of occupied buildings and safety 
critical equipment. 
In contrast with gasoline overfill incidents, where all of the recorded incidents that caused very 
large clouds (R>200 m) have resulted in explosions, there are several recorded cases of large LPG 
clouds from pipeline failures that apparently progressed as flash fires throughout (Casella 2002). 
Part of the reason for this difference may be the potential for an LPG release from some source 
geometries to form very rich clouds in low wind speed conditions. It is difficult to distinguish 
between a flash fire that (initially) progresses over the top of a rich cloud and a flash fire in a pre-
mixed cloud that is flammable through its full depth. Where flash fires have occurred in nil/low-
wind conditions (and the depth and homogeneity can be estimated), the mass of hydrocarbons 
released and cloud sizes are consistent with very rich (>UFL) mixtures. 
Our review of damage caused by explosions in low-lying gravity driven clouds showed a clear 
correlation between the depth of the cloud and the level of damage to those objects sensitive to 
overpressure and especially those sensitive to drag. Presumably this reflects the increased impulse 
associated with the explosion of deep clouds that accumulated in low-lying areas of the sites. It 
should be recognised that the erection of vapor barriers along the site boundary, to prevent the 
escape of vapor, will tend to increase the depth of the vapor cloud on the site. This may increase 
the destructive potential of any severe deflagration and the risk of DDT. 
 
Explosion Mechanism 
One factor that is normally ignored in theories of explosion propagation is the effect of thermal 
radiation. Soot production from pre–mixed flames is low and the potential for radiative heat 
transfer to unburned gas is generally considered to be low. However in real explosions it is 
common for an initial blast to disturb dust on the ground or other surfaces around the point of 
initiation. If the amount of dust is very high, and it is combustible the result may be a series of 
secondary dust explosions.  
The emissivity of flames and absorption coefficient of unburned gas are greatly increased by dust 
contamination at much lower mass concentrations than would be required for a dust exploions: a 
wide range of dusts including incombustible materials have this effect. Heat transfer from flames 
to unburned gas is consequently much more important in explosions where there is potential for 
re-elevation of dust by the effects of blast ahead of the explosion front. The effect becomes very 
important at the large scale involved in VCEs. 
The most important effects of thermal radiation occur within very large scale turbulent flames. The 
mixing and combustion process is driven by large scale eddies generated by unsteady separation 
of the boundary layers on obstacles or the ground. The flame front is stretched and contorted by 
these eddies – hugely increasing the area over which smaller scale eddies and eventually diffusion 
can drive the initiation of combustion. Although high flame speeds depend on the distortion of the 
flame front by obstacles, it is well known that the reactivity of the gas is also important in 
determining the rate of combustion in a given geometry; for example, acetylene shows a much 
greater tendency to flame acceleration than propane. 
It can be shown (Atkinson 2015) that radiative heat transfer to pockets of unburned gas within a 
large flame that is lightly contaminated with dust may raise the temperature of the unburned 
mixture by 230°C or more. This degree of pre-warming is sufficient to raise the laminar burning 
velocity of propane to that of acetylene (Poinsot and Veynante 2005). It is reasonable to expect 
the potential for flame acceleration in such a case to be characteristic of acetylene rather than 
propane. The turbulence intensity required to support combustion rates consistent with a transition 
to a severe explosion is close to an order of magnitude lower for acetylene than propane (Atkinson 
2015).  
Combustion of clouds contaminated with particles is more likely to proceed in an unstable manner 
than is the case for uncontaminated clouds. The temperature of unburned gas will increase 
throughout a flame eddy which may lead to a phase of rapid burnout and potentially a localised 
peak in pressure. When pre-heated gas has been consumed, the rate of burning will fall until 
another large eddy is ignited. This means that there may be episodes of very rapid burning and 
localised high pressures even if the overall speed of the flame is sub-sonic. In this case the pressure 
waves associated with episodes of rapid burn-out would travel ahead of the flame front and could 
provide the means to re-elevate dust in the unburned gas. This mechanism could explain the 
damage observed in a number of large VCEs (San Juan, Buncefield) in which flames apparently 
travelled at sub-sonic speeds (on average) but showed evidence of widespread episodes of more 
rapid combustion. 
 
Implications of findings for risk assessment and emergency planning at petrochemical sites 
Results from this review suggest that risk assessments and emergency planning should consider 
both windy and nil/low-wind cases – considering different types of release together with the 
weather conditions in which they could produce large clouds. In simplified assessments, for sites 
where vapor release rates below 100 kg/s are expected, it would be appropriate to neglect windy 
dispersion cases and focus on nil-wind scenarios. A simplified approach of this sort is now used 
by HSE in the specification of planning zones around gasoline terminals (HSE SPC/TECH/GEN 
43, HSE 2007). 
Different approaches to mitigation may be appropriate if nil/low-wind scenarios are considered. 
For example: detection of gas plumes in windy conditions generally requires a large number of 
closely spaced devices and the chances of limiting maximum cloud size and risk of ignition by 
shut-down are low – because the cloud reaches its maximum size very quickly. Investment in such 
systems may not be warranted. On the other hand, in nil/low-wind conditions the cloud develops 
slowly and can be reliably detected by a small number of sensors. Shut-down on detection may 
then be a key element of a site’s safety planning. 
The problem of nil/low-wind vapor transport (the accumulation of a gas blanket with minimal 
detrainment) is unfamiliar to many risk assessors but it is generally better defined and (in principle) 
easier to solve than the more familiar dispersion in windy conditions. Approximate methods 
suitable for fairly level sites are available (FABIG Technical Note 12: Atkinson and Pursell, 2013). 
These methods require no specialist software and assessors require a minimum of training. Some 
examples of application of these methods in incident analysis are given in Atkinson, 2015.  
In many cases high pressure (>2000 mbar) effects extended to a high proportion of the cloud and 
were not confined to areas where there was congested pipework or vegetation. The lack of reports 
of flash fires resulting from very large premixed gasoline clouds suggests that if a very large cloud 
develops in a normal industrial context, the probability of a severe explosion is high. This would 
be an appropriate assumption to make in risk assessments.  
The transition to a severe explosion regime seems to require some degree of congestion or 
confinement. Based on the incidents studied, the following may act as triggers: confined 
explosions in buildings (e.g. pump houses), dense vegetation, pipe racks and other moderately 
congested plant. Transition to a severe but non-detonative explosion regime appears to be possible 
in locations with a level of congestion well below that required to give DDT.  
The assumption that all severe explosions are detonations is not consistent with observed blast 
effects. To assume that severe explosions are possible but must be detonations is likely to 
significantly overestimate the potential on-site damage.  
Disclaimer 
This publication and the work it describes were co-funded by Pipeline and Hazardous Materials 
Safety Administration (US Department of Transport) and the UK Health and Safety Executive 
(HSE.  Its contents, including any opinions and/or conclusions expressed, are those of the authors 
alone and do not necessarily reflect HSE policy 
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